In the past couple of days, NATO has been plunged into yet another crisis after the Trump administration lashed out at the alliance’s European members for apparently not doing enough to help the US prosecute its war in Iran.
The rhetoric from senior US officials has been striking. Trump told Reuters that he felt “disgust” towards NATO, described it as a “paper tiger” to the Telegraph, and even threatened to pull the US out of the alliance entirely. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that Washington may need to reconsider the value of its membership:
“We are going to have to re-examine whether this alliance, which has served this country well for a while, is still serving that purpose—or whether it has become a one-way street where America is simply in a position to defend Europe. When we need the help of our allies, they deny us basing rights and overflight.”
Then, on Wednesday, during an Easter lunch just hours before a much-anticipated national address, Donald Trump went even further, claiming that America’s NATO allies would not support the US in the event of a war with China:
“I learned about NATO. NATO won’t be there if we ever have the big one—you know what I mean. Hopefully we won’t. My relationship is very good with the big one—better than with NATO.”
Europe Draws the Line
Broadly speaking, the administration seems to have two main grievances with NATO at the moment.
The first concerns decisions by several European countries to limit America’s use of bases and airspace. Spain, for instance, reportedly closed its airspace to US planes involved in the Iran war. Italy denied landing rights to several US bombers at the Sigonella base in eastern Sicily, while France prevented Israel from using its airspace to transport American weapons for use in the conflict.
These governments argue that such restrictions are necessary to remain compliant with international law. Washington, however, sees them as a failure to show solidarity with a fellow ally.
The Strait of Hormuz Flashpoint
The second issue is Europe’s reluctance to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. This narrow waterway between Iran and Oman connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Aden and, by extension, global markets. In normal times, roughly 20% of the world’s oil and gas flows through it.
Since the outbreak of war, however, traffic has collapsed. Iran has launched missile and drone strikes on transiting vessels and declared that passage now requires Iranian permission.
US officials have made three main arguments in urging European NATO members to get involved.
Washington’s Case—and Europe’s Response
First, they argue that European allies are obliged to support the US. But this claim is weak. NATO’s Article 5 applies only when a member is attacked—not when it initiates military action.
Second, they argue that Europe “owes” the US for its support in Ukraine. This is a difficult case to make, given that the Trump administration has withdrawn most military aid to Kyiv and spent much of the past year pursuing a more conciliatory approach toward Moscow. More broadly, US support for Ukraine was always driven primarily by American strategic interests rather than any sense of obligation to Europe.
Third, Washington argues that reopening the Strait is in Europe’s own economic interest. While Europe does depend on energy flows through the region, the reality is more complicated. Most oil passing through the Strait goes to Asia, and any disruption primarily results in higher global prices—affecting the US and Europe alike.
Nor does America’s status as a major oil producer fundamentally change this dynamic. Higher prices may benefit US energy firms, but they are a net negative for the wider economy and for consumers.
Why Europe Is Staying Out
Perhaps most importantly, European governments doubt that deeper involvement in the conflict would actually reopen the Strait. Doing so would likely require either Iran’s capitulation or a negotiated settlement—neither of which seems imminent. On the contrary, escalation could make diplomacy more difficult while increasing the risk of a wider war.
This helps explain Europe’s broader reluctance to engage. Even strongly pro-American governments are wary of entering a conflict without clear objectives or an exit strategy.
Is This the End of NATO?
Formally, no. Under recent US legislation, the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from NATO without either a two-thirds Senate vote or separate congressional approval.
In practice, however, the alliance looks increasingly fragile. The US clearly believes its European allies are failing to pull their weight, while many in Europe doubt that Washington would respond adequately to an Article 5 crisis.
Even without a formal withdrawal, the US could scale back its commitment—reducing troop deployments and disengaging from NATO structures. Such a move would stop short of leaving the alliance but could render it effectively hollow.
An Alliance in Name?
NATO may not be dead. But in its current state, it is beginning to look less like a cohesive military alliance and more like a fragile political arrangement—one that persists on paper, even as its underlying unity comes under growing strain.